For more than two decades, the Supreme Court has issued a long series of wins for plaintiffs seeking to protect their religious practices. On June 23, 2026, though, the majority delivered an uncommon defeat in this contentious area.
, a 6-3 judgment, rejected the claim of Damon Landor, a Rastafarian whose hair was forcibly shaved in prison. Landor had for almost 20 years as an expression of his beliefs – part of a biblical practice known as .” Like lower court judges, the Supreme Court did not dispute that officials violated Landor’s rights. However, the high court’s majority ruled that he could not sue individual officials at the prison.
The case stands out for at least three other reasons.
First, Landor v. Louisiana underscores the complexity and far-reaching nature of religious freedom laws in the United States and the increasingly diverse faith traditions to which they apply. Christians now represent , down from 78% in 2007, while 29% have no religious affiliation and 7% belong to other faith traditions.
Second, Landor’s case gained support from many groups typically at odds over how to protect religious freedoms – groups .
Finally, the case highlights the religious rights of the in U.S. prisons, jails and detention and correctional facilities – and the challenge of holding their public employees accountable when those rights are violated.
Religious vow
Landor was for possessing methamphetamine, cocaine, amphetamine and marijuana.
At first, officials respected his religious practice. Just three years earlier, a federal appeals court affirmed that Rastafarian inmates under a federal law passed in 2000: .
Toward the end of his sentence, Landor was transferred to a different correctional facility in the state. There – with three weeks left for Landor to serve – the warden , directing guards to shackle Landor and forcibly shave his head.
After finishing his sentence, Landor filed suit for money damages under the . The act forbids the government and its officials from imposing “substantial burden(s)” on incarcerated people’s to the free exercise of religion. It also protects religious groups from discrimination through zoning restrictions.
Journey through the courts
In 2022, a condemned Landor’s treatment but rejected his claim, concluding that money damages were not an appropriate remedy under the act.
The following year, the “emphatically condemn(ed) the treatment that Landor endured.” However, the panel unanimously affirmed the lower court’s decision, based on that plaintiffs cannot sue government officials in their individual capacities for monetary damages – only the institution.
Landor’s attorneys then sought an “en banc” hearing. In this , parties seek further review by all of the judges in a federal circuit. The court , as that this was a question for the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court after a variety of organizations, , submitted , or “friend of the court,” briefs in favor of Landor. These included , for example, which typically supports plaintiffs wishing to keep religion out of public life. They also included , which usually represents people seeking to increase faith’s role in public life, and .
At issue was not whether Landor’s rights had been violated but whether he could sue an individual official, namely the warden, for monetary damages. During oral arguments on Nov. 10, 2025, the .
Legal dilemma
That skepticism was reflected in . It was essentially a procedural ruling about the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act rather than a judgment on the merits of Landor’s religious freedom claim.
Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s dissent was joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
The majority’s argument that Landor could not sue centered on the of the U.S. Constitution – the source of Congress’ authority to create the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The spending clause allows the legislature to spend money to provide for the “.” If a state or institution uses federal funds, their officials agree to certain conditions; if they violate those conditions, Congress can remove funding.
But the spending clause does not give Congress authority to hold individual employees accountable, Gorsuch argued in his 18-page opinion. Prison officials had not “ to answer private suits” under the act, and so they could not be held directly liable for monetary damages. Otherwise, Congress would have “.”
Jackson’s 29-page dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the spending clause. The ruling, she contended, “’” under which “Congress has been able to use its spending power to reach beyond direct recipients of federal funds.” As such, she worried that the court’s order imposed a “.”
Jackson also lamented the decision’s potential consequences for inmates. Although the goal of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act was to protect prisoners’ faith practices, she worried that people “like Landor in state prisons – no matter how blatant – will often be left remediless.”
Bigger picture
At a glance, the Landor case appears to be a procedural disagreement rather than one over religious freedom.
However, I argue Landor v. Louisiana must be viewed as a setback for religious liberty, raising a serious question about whether minority faiths have as much protection under the First Amendment as larger religions. The decision is also something of a surprise to me, because the Supreme Court has recently upheld free exercise rights in multiple high-profile cases, almost all of which involve Christianity – such as a on the field after public school games.
Portions of this article originally appeared in published on Nov. 6, 2025.
Original article
Comments