BY COMFORT OGBONNA
A warning by former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has sharpened concerns among Gulf states that any Iran–U.S. negotiations may end up achieving only a limited easing of tensions, potentially focused on reopening the Strait of Hormuz rather than delivering the broader regional de-escalation they see as essential.
Officials and analysts expect the next round of talks, scheduled to be held in Islamabad, to increasingly prioritise technical limits on Iran’s uranium enrichment and discussions around Tehran’s ability to influence or disrupt traffic through Hormuz. The strait is the world’s most important oil shipping corridor, carrying roughly a fifth of global crude flows, making it a central point of pressure in any regional confrontation.
Gulf officials warn that this narrowing of focus risks legitimising Iran’s leverage over global energy supply chains rather than reducing it. In their view, managing that leverage for the sake of global market stability could come at the cost of long-term regional security, particularly for Gulf states that sit directly within range of Iran’s military capabilities but are not formally included in the negotiations.
Sources familiar with Gulf thinking say the diplomatic emphasis has shifted away from Iran’s missile programme and regional proxy networks, and toward enrichment thresholds and the implicit acceptance of Iran’s strategic position at Hormuz. While talks remain deadlocked over enrichment—Tehran continues to reject a “zero enrichment” demand as well as proposals to transfer stockpiles abroad—some officials argue that the deeper concern is the changing hierarchy of issues being negotiated.
“At the end of the day, Hormuz will be the red line,” one Gulf source said, noting that the strait has moved from a background concern to a central bargaining chip. “It wasn’t an issue before. It is now. The goal posts have moved.”
Iran’s wartime threats to disrupt Gulf shipping have already eroded long-standing assumptions about the inviolability of the strait, turning it into a more credible instrument of pressure than in previous diplomatic cycles. That shift was captured in comments by former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, who suggested that Iran had effectively demonstrated a form of deterrence without crossing into nuclear weapons.
He described the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic lever with “inexhaustible” potential, framing it as a tool capable of imposing economic costs and shaping geopolitical behaviour without formal escalation into nuclear conflict. His remarks reinforced the perception among Gulf officials that control over maritime chokepoints is becoming as significant as conventional military capabilities in shaping negotiations.
Iranian officials, speaking privately, appear to echo that logic. One senior Iranian security source described the Strait as a long-prepared instrument of deterrence rather than a last-resort option, arguing that Tehran has systematically planned for scenarios involving its closure or disruption.
According to this view, the strait functions as a “golden asset” rooted in geography, giving Iran a form of leverage that cannot be easily neutralised. A second source linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards went further, suggesting that the longstanding taboo around using Hormuz as a pressure tool had effectively been broken, and that it now serves as a visible reminder of Iran’s ability to raise global energy costs if pushed.
This evolution is precisely what alarms Gulf Arab states. Analysts note that while Iranian missiles, drones, and proxy forces have repeatedly shaped regional security dynamics, negotiations are now increasingly being framed around Hormuz because of its immediate global economic consequences. That focus, Gulf officials argue, risks sidelining their own core security concerns, including missile threats to urban centres and infrastructure, as well as the activities of armed non-state groups aligned with Tehran.
At the heart of the dispute, Gulf sources say, is not simply who physically controls the Strait of Hormuz, but who determines the rules governing its use. That shift reflects a broader transformation in international relations in which fixed legal or institutional norms are giving way to more flexible, power-driven arrangements.
Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, president of the Emirates Policy Center, warned that this dynamic creates a structural imbalance between those who shape the rules and those who bear the consequences when those rules are tested or broken. She argued that what is emerging is not a genuine settlement of regional tensions but a managed equilibrium that allows conflict to persist at lower intensity.
“What is taking shape today is not a historic settlement,” she said, describing it instead as a system designed to keep tensions contained rather than resolved. She also noted that Gulf states remain exposed to both missile threats and proxy conflicts while major diplomatic processes appear to prioritise only the most globally disruptive risks.
Analysts caution that such an approach may reduce the risk of immediate escalation but does not address underlying drivers of instability. Instead, it could create a controlled but persistent state of tension that is tolerable for major powers but increasingly burdensome for states located within the region itself.
Gulf economies have already felt the impact of the wider conflict environment, including increased costs for energy exports, insurance premiums, and shipping security. Even alternative trade routes, while offering some diversification, remain vulnerable to regional instability and do not fully eliminate exposure to Iranian military reach.
Diplomatic sources say Gulf states have privately urged Washington to avoid granting sweeping sanctions relief in any settlement with Tehran, favouring a more gradual approach that tests compliance over time. Their concerns remain focused on Iran’s missile capabilities and the continued use of proxy forces across the region, which they view as unresolved core threats.
Across the Gulf, attitudes toward U.S. policy are increasingly mixed, ranging from quiet frustration to concern over decisions taken without sufficient regional consultation. Some officials argue that while the United States remains indispensable to regional security architecture, its approach is often unilateral and insufficiently attuned to local vulnerabilities.
Saudi-based Gulf Research Center chairman Abdulaziz Sager said any durable framework for dealing with Iran must involve regional actors more directly, arguing that external powers alone cannot design a stable security order for the Gulf.
At the same time, Gulf officials acknowledge that U.S. military capabilities remain decisive in shaping outcomes, particularly through air defence systems, naval presence, and protection of critical infrastructure. However, some analysts argue that this reliance also exposes structural limitations.
UAE academic Abdulkhaleq Abdulla noted that Gulf states were able to withstand recent escalation largely due to their own defensive capabilities and advanced U.S.-supplied systems, including Patriot and THAAD missile defence platforms. Even so, he warned that reliance on a single external security guarantor has clear limits, particularly when emerging threats are underestimated or misread.
Other regional analysts echo that view, arguing that one of the key lessons from recent conflict cycles is that external protection, while essential, cannot substitute for a more balanced and regionally inclusive security framework.
Dubai-based researcher Mohammed Baharoon added that overdependence on a single protector carries inherent risks, particularly in fast-evolving crises where strategic assumptions may not always align with realities on the ground.
Gulf officials maintain that they have long cautioned against escalation with Iran, but have remained largely silent since the outbreak of direct conflict, reflecting both diplomatic restraint and uncertainty over a situation that imposes economic and security costs on them without giving them direct control over outcomes.
As negotiations continue between Washington and Tehran, Gulf states are increasingly arguing that their exclusion is no longer just a regional concern, but a global one, given the central role of the Strait of Hormuz in international energy markets and the wider stability of global trade.
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