By Ginika Igboke 

Two oil tankers and a liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier appear to have successfully passed through the Strait of Hormuz on April 3, according to data from marine tracking platforms.

TankerTrackers.com reported on X that the vessels include the Dhalkut, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi oil; the Habrut, transporting 2 million barrels of crude from the United Arab Emirates; and the Sohar LNG, departing from the UAE.

VesselFinder data indicated that all three ships cleared the strait and were positioned off the coast of Oman near the capital, Muscat, on April 3.

At least one of the vessels is owned by an Omani shipping company. Iran’s state-run IRNA news agency cited Deputy Minister for Legal and International Affairs Kazem Gharibabadi as saying Tehran and Oman are working on a protocol to monitor vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

The Dhalkut and Habrut are registered under the Marshall Islands flag, while the Sohar LNG sails under Panama’s flag. According to the Equasis marine database, the Habrut is owned by a company based in Muscat.

Shipping outlet Lloyd’s List noted that Omani-linked vessels attempting to exit the الخليج could become the first in nearly three weeks to pass through the chokepoint without using a so-called “Tehran-approved” corridor.

Additional tracking data showed two fully loaded very large crude carriers (VLCCs) and an empty LNG tanker navigating close to Oman’s coastline, all indicating destinations within the country.

TankerTrackers.com also observed that the vessels avoided the Iranian-controlled passage between Larak and Qeshm islands—sometimes referred to as a “tollbooth” route.

Unconventional Route Raises Questions

Instead, the ships reportedly sailed along the northern coastline of Oman’s Musandam governorate—an unusual path not typically used for commercial shipping.

Under normal conditions, vessels travel through a central two-lane channel in the Strait of Hormuz. However, ongoing conflict has forced many ships to divert northward near Larak Island, placing them within Iranian territorial waters and subjecting them to monitoring or escort.

According to Lloyd’s List Intelligence, some shipowners have contacted intermediaries linked to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), receiving authorization codes and escorts for safe passage.

While not all vessels reportedly pay transit fees, some have settled payments in Chinese yuan.

It remains unclear whether Iran permitted the April 2–3 transits without payment or under alternative arrangements. Any financial transactions tied to such passage could risk triggering U.S. sanctions.

Nicholas Mulder, a history professor at Cornell University and author of The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, said Iran has developed systems capable of accepting cryptocurrency payments, potentially enabling ships to bypass traditional financial restrictions.

“As this energy crisis deepens, more countries may be willing to risk U.S. sanctions because access to energy and essential goods becomes the greater priority,” Mulder said during an appearance on the Breaking Points podcast.

Rising Tensions and Maritime Risks

The U.N. Security Council is scheduled to meet on April 4 to address Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy artery through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil and gas supplies pass.

Disruptions in the region have already driven up energy prices, placing additional strain on economies worldwide.

Although vessel movements can typically be tracked using Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders, there has been a surge in GPS spoofing and signal jamming incidents in recent years, particularly across the Middle East.

Such interference has been linked to maritime safety risks. In June 2025, GPS disruption was blamed for a collision in the Gulf of Oman between the Liberia-flagged tanker Front Eagle and the Adalynn, a vessel identified by Lloyd’s List as part of a so-called “dark fleet.”

Maritime cybersecurity experts note that GPS spoofing may be used both for concealment by operators and as a deliberate hostile tactic, further complicating navigation in an already volatile region.

Original article