Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, developed a pattern that became familiar to those around him. At moments when a person’s position had already been decided, Mao would often appear relaxed, attentive, and unusually cordial.
Accounts from internal Communist Party meetings, along with notes kept by Li Rui, who served as Mao’s secretary, describe how these encounters unfolded. The tone of a meeting could shift without warning. A conversation might begin with encouragement or reassurance. What followed, in many cases, was removal from office, isolation, or detention. By the later years of Mao’s rule, senior officials learned to watch such meetings closely, even when nothing appeared outwardly wrong.
Mao lured his top military commander out of Beijing with a promise
Peng Dehuai, who led Chinese forces during the Korean War and later served as minister of defense, lost favor in 1959 after criticizing the famine linked to the Great Leap Forward. For years, he sought to return to political life.
On September 23, 1965, Mao summoned him to Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound in Beijing. The meeting did not resemble earlier confrontations. Mao greeted Peng warmly, held his hand, and spoke in a tone that suggested past disagreements might no longer matter. He referred to Peng’s earlier letter and said he had been glad to receive it. He also remarked that earlier disputes could be viewed differently with time.
Mao then proposed that Peng take a position connected to the “Third Front,” a major industrial program in southwestern China. The offer suggested renewed trust and possible future responsibility.
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As the meeting drew to a close, Mao raised a different issue. He asked whether Peng had ever been involved in the Gao Gang–Rao Shushi case, a purge from the previous decade. The question changed the atmosphere immediately.
Not long after, Peng was sent away from Beijing. The assignment placed him far from the center of power. When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, Red Guards detained him and subjected him to repeated public denunciations. He died in 1974 while still in custody.
Mao gave his chosen successor nonexistent books to read
Liu Shaoqi, once Mao’s designated successor and the president of China, became a central target during the Cultural Revolution.
On Jan. 13, 1967, Mao met Liu at the Great Hall of the People. The meeting remained calm and outwardly courteous. Mao spoke with him about his health and asked about his family. Before Liu left, Mao suggested that he read several works, including one on mechanical materialism and another titled Robots.
No such books were known to exist at the time.
Within days, Liu’s telephone line was cut. His residence was placed under strict control, and his family lost freedom of movement.
Liu died in November 1969 in Kaifeng. He was held in isolation as his physical condition deteriorated, without access to adequate medical care.
Mao’s secretary recognized the warning signs
Yang Shangkun, who oversaw internal Party communications, was also called in for a meeting with Mao in 1965. Mao spoke in a steady and measured tone, praised Yang’s work, and suggested that he spend time working at the grassroots level.
Yang left the meeting reassured and later described the exchange to Tian Jiaying, one of Mao’s secretaries.
Tian reacted with concern. According to accounts from within Zhongnanhai, he viewed the tone itself as significant. A direct reprimand, in his view, would have been easier to interpret. A calm and distant conversation suggested a different outcome.
Not long after, Yang was detained and remained in custody for years. Tian Jiaying later died during the Cultural Revolution.
Mao restricted medical treatment for his own prime minister
Zhou Enlai, China’s longtime premier, remained one of Mao’s most important administrators for decades. He managed daily government operations and played a central role during repeated political campaigns.
In the early 1970s, Zhou was diagnosed with bladder cancer. Internal accounts later described limits placed on his treatment. Early-stage surgery that might have slowed the disease was not approved at the time.
During political campaigns, Mao at times appeared to shield Zhou from criticism. At other moments, Zhou was required to take part in internal Party self-criticism.
Zhou’s condition worsened over time. He died on Jan. 8, 1976.
A pattern inside the Party system
Accounts from those who worked closely with Mao describe a political environment in which personal signals did not always match the decisions being made. Reassurance in one setting could coincide with outcomes that had already been determined elsewhere.
Li Rui, who observed Mao over many years, noted that individuals often accepted these signals at face value. Meetings that appeared to reopen possibilities sometimes marked the point at which those possibilities had already narrowed.
Miles Yu, a China policy scholar and former U.S. State Department adviser, has argued that this pattern reflects how authority functioned within the Party. Officials could remain in place one moment and be removed the next, often without clear warning.