By Li Deyan
The most recent meeting of China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee ended in a political anticlimax—and in doing so, revealed something far more consequential. Despite intense speculation and clear institutional signals, the body failed to revoke the NPC delegate status of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, two senior military figures officially announced as being under investigation.
What looked, on the surface, like a procedural delay now appears to be a blocked political operation. Analysts close to elite CCP politics say the episode points to resistance at the highest levels of the system against Xi Jinping’s effort to retroactively legalize the detention—and potential purge—of top People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commanders.
The emergency session that avoided its real target
On Feb. 4, 2026, the 20th meeting of the 14th NPC Standing Committee was convened at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People, presided over by NPC chairman Zhao Leji. The official communiqué announced the termination of NPC delegate status for three figures from China’s military-industrial complex: Zhou Xinmin of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China; Luo Qi of the China National Nuclear Corporation; and Liu Cangli of the China Academy of Engineering Physics.
All three had long careers in sensitive defense-related sectors. Their removal reduced the total number of NPC delegates from 2,900 to 2,897.
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But conspicuously absent from the list were Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, a CMC member—despite prior indications that the session had been convened precisely to deal with their cases.
Just two days earlier, on Feb. 2, state media reported that a chairmen’s meeting of the NPC Standing Committee had reviewed a report from the Credentials Examination Committee concerning “individual delegates.” The unusually tight timeline and the sudden scheduling of the Feb. 4 meeting led many observers to conclude that the leadership was preparing to strip Zhang and Liu of their NPC status—an essential legal step before formal prosecution.
That step never came. As of now, both men remain listed as NPC delegates representing the PLA and the People’s Armed Police.
A source familiar with CCP internal deliberations, using the pseudonym Jin Zhe, told overseas Chinese media that the military had formally submitted a proposal to the NPC seeking approval to revoke Zhang and Liu’s delegate status.
Under normal circumstances, Jin noted, there would have been no reason to convene an extraordinary Standing Committee session at all. A routine meeting was already scheduled for late February to prepare for the annual “Two Sessions,” China’s most important political gatherings.
“The only logical explanation,” Jin said, “is that the proposal existed—and that it failed.”
If accurate, this would mark a rare and consequential breakdown in coordination between the NPC system and Xi Jinping’s political agenda, and point directly to friction between Xi and Zhao Leji.
U.S.-based commentator Tang Jingyuan reached the same conclusion. The Feb. 4 session, he argued, was effectively “custom-designed” to deal with Zhang and Liu. Its failure to do so indicates that the operation was interrupted at a very high level.
An unprecedented procedural anomaly
A mainland constitutional law scholar writing under the pseudonym Huang Tian stressed that the episode defies established precedent.
In earlier purges involving former CMC vice chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, and former Joint Staff Department chief Fang Fenghui, NPC delegate status was revoked within months of political conclusions being reached. Once such cases entered the NPC’s formal agenda, outcomes were swift and decisive.
Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were officially announced as under investigation on Jan. 24, 2026. The NPC Standing Committee convened on Feb. 2 and again on Feb. 4—yet declined to act.
The issue, Huang argued, is not that the investigation was “too recent.” In past cases, if timing was deemed premature, the matter simply did not appear on the agenda. What has no precedent is convening a Standing Committee meeting and then deliberately avoiding action against the principal targets.
“This is not delay,” Huang said. “It is obstruction.”
Another scholar, identified only as Mr. He, said the incident demonstrates that the CCP leadership has failed to reach consensus on core questions of military power.
“This is not the NPC suddenly becoming independent,” he said. “It is Xi Jinping’s authority encountering resistance at a critical node—control of the Central Military Commission and the coercive apparatus of the state.”
The absence of a resolution, he added, shows that top-level decision-making is no longer moving smoothly through the system.
Zhao Leji under pressure—from both sides
Tang Jingyuan emphasized that Zhao Leji is not known as a figure inclined to challenge Xi Jinping. On the contrary, Tang believes Zhao initially moved under pressure from Xi to convene the Standing Committee and complete the necessary legal steps to strip Zhang and Liu of their NPC status.
Yet the plan collapsed.
The official meeting notice listed attendees from the State Council, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the National Supervisory Commission—but made no mention of officials from the military’s Discipline Inspection Commission. Such officials would have been mandatory participants had the meeting been set to revoke the delegate status of serving military officers.
Their absence strongly suggests that the proposal was pulled before the meeting began.
Tang argues that Zhao must have come under countervailing pressure—pressure strong enough to override even his deference to Xi. The result was the sudden “abortion” of a critical step in Xi’s strategy.
At the heart of the struggle is what Tang describes as Xi Jinping’s attempt to “get on the bus first and buy the ticket later”—detaining Zhang and Liu first, then retroactively legalizing the process.
Under CCP rules, officials who retain NPC delegate status cannot be formally investigated. Revoking that status is therefore a mandatory legal gateway. Blocking it keeps the entire operation in a gray zone—exposing Xi’s actions as procedurally illegal and politically personal.
Anti-Xi forces, Tang argues, are determined to prevent this retroactive legalization. If Xi fails, he cannot compel unified support from the Party, government, or military.
The failed NPC maneuver reveals the true focal point of the current Zhongnanhai power struggle: whether the detention of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli can be made legal.
That determination will decide whether Xi can force the PLA to reaffirm loyalty and launch a full-scale internal purge—one increasingly compared to the Cultural Revolution in its scope and brutality.
If Xi succeeds, Tang warned, no one is safe: Party elders, “red princelings,” and sitting officials such as Hu Chunhua and Shi Taifeng could vanish overnight, their fate unknown.
No Confessions—and a Darker Possibility
Tang believes Zhao Leji’s resistance was enabled by a fatal weakness in Xi’s position: the absence of confessions.
In China’s disciplinary and judicial system, a confession is often sufficient for conviction, even without corroborating evidence. This is why coercive interrogation and torture remain routine.
A former Shanghai businessman, Hu Liren, has alleged that Zhang Youxia was detained at a Central Guard Bureau training facility in Gu’an County, Hebei Province, and subjected to severe torture under the direction of Cai Qi, a senior Xi ally. The claim cannot be independently verified.
What is verifiable, Tang argues, is that Xi has failed to produce confessions from either Zhang or Liu. That failure, he says, points to a chilling possibility: the two men may already be dead.
If Zhang Youxia has indeed died in custody, Xi Jinping faces an extraordinary crisis. Without confessions or evidence, how can he explain the death of a top PLA commander—one who is also a high-ranking “red princeling,” the son of a revolutionary veteran?
The political consequences would far exceed those surrounding the death of former Premier Li Keqiang, which authorities could attribute to a heart attack. Zhang Youxia was officially detained; at his rank, suicide would have been virtually impossible.
Recent online rumors about the alleged suicide of former CMC vice chairman He Weidong, Tang suggests, may be preparing public opinion for an even more explosive announcement.