By Li Deyan
The Chinese Communist Party recently convened a Central Politburo meeting. One conspicuous and awkward detail stood out: both military representatives of the 20th Politburo—Zhang Youxia and He Weidong—were absent. State broadcaster CCTV aired no footage from the meeting, offering only a studio anchor reading prepared remarks. Analysts say that following the removal of Zhang Youxia, Taiwan has entered a more dangerous phase. Some insiders further claim that the core conflict between Xi Jinping and Zhang centered on whether to launch a military attack on Taiwan.
Military representatives absent from Politburo meeting
According to Xinhua, Xi Jinping chaired a Politburo meeting on Jan. 30, 2026. The meeting reviewed work reports from Party leadership groups overseeing the National People’s Congress Standing Committee, the State Council, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Central Secretariat for 2025. It also placed special emphasis on the need to “uphold the Party Central Committee’s centralized and unified leadership.”
What drew attention, however, was how the meeting was covered. CCTV did not broadcast any on-site footage or images. The report consisted solely of an anchor reading the official script. The broadcast made no mention of investigations into Zhang Youxia or Liu Zhenli, concluding only with the vague line that “the meeting also studied other matters.”
Notably, the two military representatives originally seated on the 20th Politburo—Zhang Youxia and He Weidong—were both absent from the Jan. 30 meeting. Both men have already been officially announced as having fallen from power.
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Commentator Li Linyi observed that although Xi Jinping also serves as chairman of the Central Military Commission, he is a civilian leader without military rank. In effect, this meant that no PLA representatives were present at the Politburo meeting. Li described the situation as one of the most severe political disruptions the CCP has faced since the Cultural Revolution.
With the 21st Party Congress approaching, Li said there may be no suitable replacements in the near term. This, he argued, signals that future Politburo decision-making could become increasingly distorted, particularly on military-related issues.
Shen Ming-shih, a research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research, told overseas Chinese-language media that without military representatives, Politburo deliberations on Taiwan or external expansion would lack professional military input. If Xi were to impulsively consider using force against Taiwan, Shen warned, the Politburo could devolve into a rubber stamp, with loyalists echoing Xi’s wishes and increasing the risk of strategic miscalculation.
As a result, following Zhang Youxia’s removal, external attention has increasingly shifted to whether Xi might recklessly pursue military action against Taiwan.
Uncertainty grows over Taiwan policy
On Jan. 30, Taiwan’s National Chengchi University hosted a symposium titled “Upheaval in PLA Senior Leadership and Its Impact on Cross-Strait Relations.” Experts and scholars discussed the downstream effects of turmoil within the CCP’s military leadership and how Taiwan should respond.
Ma Zhenkun, a professor at Taiwan’s National Defense University Institute of Chinese Communist Military Affairs, said that with Zhang Youxia sidelined, Beijing’s military intentions toward Taiwan have entered a period of uncertainty. Although Xi remains the final decision-maker, Ma noted that he still requires trusted military advisers. With leadership roles unsettled, Beijing’s Taiwan policy has become unpredictable—an increasingly dangerous development for Taiwan’s security.
Jieh Jong, an adjunct assistant professor at Tamkang University’s Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, warned of the heightened risk of accidental conflict triggered by political shifts or military incidents. Following extensive purges, current PLA commanders may no longer dare to speak candidly to Xi, increasing the likelihood of misjudgment. Operationally, officers may err on the side of excessive aggression to align with nationalist expectations, further complicating crisis management.
Taiwan dispute emerges as core Xi–Zhang conflict
On Jan. 29, a source using the pseudonym Shen Jianhui, described as having knowledge of PLA internal affairs, told overseas Chinese-language media that the conflict between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping was not sudden but the result of long-standing accumulation.
According to this account, dissatisfaction with Xi among senior PLA leaders peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic. Zhang Youxia and other CMC leaders, along with active-duty and retired military personnel, reportedly criticized Xi privately for avoiding front-line exposure while seeking continued rule. Xi was accused of being “fearful of risk” while demanding loyalty and extended tenure.
Shen said that throughout the three-year pandemic, Xi never personally visited front-line sites. His only visit to a military hospital involved appearing in a large hall via video link, while medical staff worked elsewhere. This risk-averse approach, Shen claimed, provoked widespread resentment within the military. “Not only serving officers, but also veterans and military families openly criticized him,” Shen said.
According to Shen, the most fundamental disagreement between Zhang Youxia and Xi centered on Taiwan. Zhang and most senior PLA commanders were said to oppose the use of force.
PLA leaders, Shen said, held a sober assessment of the costs of a real conflict over Taiwan. Actual combat, they believed, would result in severe personnel casualties and equipment losses. “You can spend decades building a service branch, and it could be wiped out in one war,” Shen quoted them as saying. While military exercises could project strength in peacetime, real war would involve risks of an entirely different magnitude.
Multiple sources told overseas Chinese-language media that Zhang Youxia repeatedly opposed immediate military action against Taiwan during internal CCP meetings. He reportedly argued that Taiwan’s defense system was second only to Israel’s and more robust than Ukraine’s. He also warned that U.S., Japanese, Australian, and Five Eyes intervention was highly likely. A prolonged conflict would destabilize China domestically, and the PLA’s current manpower and logistics, Zhang argued, were insufficient to sustain a long war. He advocated stabilizing conditions and avoiding conflict during economic downturn and diplomatic isolation—positions Xi reportedly viewed as “undermining morale.”
Xi’s swift move against Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli shocked observers and fueled speculation of a new, harsher military purge.
Policy dispute, not corruption
A recent report by the U.S.-based Jamestown Foundation argued that the PLA purge was not simply an anti-corruption campaign, but stemmed from fundamental disagreements over military policy. According to the report, the joint operations training timeline promoted by Zhang Youxia failed to align with Xi’s demand that the PLA be capable of attacking Taiwan by 2027. This mismatch was interpreted by Xi as resistance and noncompliance.
The report noted that January 2026 marked the beginning of the final annual training cycle before 2027. Disagreements between Xi and Zhang had escalated from planning disputes to direct non-cooperation at the execution level. Zhang’s stance, the report said, posed a direct challenge to Xi’s personal authority within the Party.
The removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli reflected Xi’s attempt to strengthen personal control over the military, prioritizing political loyalty over professional competence. While this approach may intensify internal instability, the report argued, it has not altered the 2027 Taiwan timeline.
Why, then, would Xi—so cautious during the pandemic—push so insistently for military action against Taiwan?
Shen Jianhui suggested Xi’s core motivation was personal power preservation. “Xi cannot afford to step down,” he said. “Once he does, his family’s corruption issues will all surface.”
According to insiders, Xi fears political reckoning once he loses Party authority. Achieving a major political milestone such as unifying Taiwan is therefore seen as a way to reinforce his legitimacy.
Commentator Wang He noted that for Xi to secure a third, fourth, or even lifelong term, reclaiming Taiwan would stand as his greatest achievement. Zhang Youxia, by contrast, fully understood the PLA’s real capabilities and the balance of power among China, the United States, Taiwan, and the broader Asia-Pacific. For that reason, Zhang and others were unwilling to gamble.
The dispute over Taiwan—a decision bearing on the CCP’s future fate—became intertwined with factional purges on both sides. As Wang put it, policy divergence and power struggles merged into a single, dangerous confrontation.
Editor’s Note: