By Jiang Feng
The seasons turn. What returns, and what fades, takes old memories with it like water. Humanity has lived through war and peace, and once wrote chapters of real brilliance. Yet the same errors repeat. So do the tragedies and the wounds.
On a restless, crowded planet, geopolitics has been stirred by politicians into a single pot of confusion. It shows how far people have fallen. In this knotted, “cut-but-never-resolved” disorder, and in those wavering shadows, one outline is said to be visible behind Beijing’s authorities. The Chinese Communist Party. In this account, it is described as a source of the world’s present chaos.
(Continued from the previous installment)
II. The Gaza war: a Middle Eastern version of ‘encircling the cities from the countryside’
While the Russia–Ukraine war was still raging, the Gaza War erupted without warning. It shocked the international community and once again struck the Middle East’s sensitive nerve.
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Before Hamas launched what it called Operation al-Aqsa Flood, the region had already shown signs of a diplomatic thaw. Saudi Arabia and Iran restored relations. Bahrain and Qatar did the same. So did the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, and Egypt and Turkey. Israel and Saudi Arabia were also moving toward normalization at the time.
Then came Oct. 7, 2023. Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups crossed from the Gaza Strip into Israel. More than 1,200 Israelis were killed, including 220 soldiers and 45 police officers. At the Nova music festival near Kibbutz Re’im, at least 260 people were killed. More than 3,400 were wounded. Another 250 were abducted and taken into Gaza as hostages.
U.S. President Joe Biden, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid, and many Western figures and media outlets described the attack as the most severe massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.
Israel mobilizes and strikes back
The killings drove Israel into grief and rage. The country moved as one, entering a state of war readiness. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and reserve units were deployed to the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and border areas with Lebanon and Syria. Israel also drew up a large-scale operation against Gaza under the codename Operation Swords of Iron.
As the security situation deteriorated, many international airlines canceled flights to Israel. That, in turn, produced scenes that some observers described as striking. Israelis abroad who received emergency reserve call-up orders immediately began searching for any way to return. El Al, Israel’s national airline, prioritized passengers holding tzav shmoneh, the emergency mobilization notice issued during wartime and special operations.
The Israeli embassy in Greece chartered 20 civilian flights, transporting about 5,000 reservists back to Israel. In the Americas, the Union of Jewish Federations of the USA coordinated with Israeli embassies in the United States and Latin America to arrange special emergency flights from Peru for reservists who were traveling in South and Central America.
Many reservists overseas also organized through WhatsApp groups to help one another find tickets. In New York alone, WhatsApp groups for Israeli reservists reportedly grew to hundreds of members. The groups included Israelis who had long lived in the area and were not called up, but volunteered anyway.
One reservist, Yotam Avrahami, who worked in investment and consulting at Deloitte in New York, left his job, said goodbye to his wife and infant daughter, and paid about $2,000 for a one-way ticket back to Israel. “It’s not only me,” he said. “All Israelis are like this.”
Avi Meyer, founder and former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Journal, wrote on X that he had just read a message from an El Al crew member. A man, described as an Orthodox Jew who declined to be identified, stood quietly near El Al’s counter at JFK Airport in New York. Anyone who showed IDF mobilization papers received a ticket to Israel. The man had reportedly paid for 250 tickets.
El Al spokesperson Ofri Rimoni said many Jews, and many Americans, came to the JFK counter asking to help buy tickets for reservists. Others paid shipping costs for reservists’ military equipment.
Hamas’ statements, and what Israel said it found
Under international condemnation and the pressure of Israel’s military response, Hamas claimed it had no plan to kill and fight, and that it aimed only to seize hostages. In this account, that claim was quickly shown to be false.
Israel said it recovered an Arabic-language operational plan marked “Top Secret” from the bodies of killed Hamas fighters. The document, as described, ordered militants to surround and infiltrate villages, attack civilian communities, and strike sites including a primary school and youth center in Kibbutz Kfar Sa’ad. It called for killing civilians, including children, and for capturing as many hostages as possible.
U.S. and foreign media reporters, including CNN, visited the attack sites with the IDF. They saw scenes described as including elderly people, women, children, and infants killed in brutal fashion. IDF Major General Itai Veruv told CNN that in 40 years of military service he had never seen a slaughter as bloody as what Hamas carried out.
Hamas later issued a public statement saying it kidnapped Israeli hostages as bargaining chips, demanding the release of all Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. It said non-Israeli hostages were not captives but “guests,” and that the group was committed to protecting their safety. Hamas said it would release these “guests” at an appropriate time.
In this narrative, that posture of “hospitality” is presented as further proof of why the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia classify Hamas as a terrorist organization. The final outcome, it says, also showed Hamas did not keep its promises. Some non-Israeli “guests” were later confirmed dead or missing.
Civilians bear the cost
War’s greatest victims are the unarmed. The Gaza War, this account says, followed the same rule. More than a million Palestinians were displaced, suffering upheaval to escape the fighting. A major humanitarian catastrophe unfolded in Gaza.
The war’s result, it argues, was plain. Hamas, notorious for using “human shields” and tunnel warfare, was driven into a desperate existence. It hid in tunnels without daylight, running and crouching like a hunted rat, surviving only by holding hostages and leaning on civilians. It called loudly for help from allies in the “Axis of Resistance,” including Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, pleading for fire support and waiting for a break.
It also cites Yahya Sinwar, described here as a former Hamas political bureau chief who held the post for only two and a half months before being killed. Sinwar is portrayed as believing that the more Palestinian civilians died, the more Hamas would benefit. The logic, as described, was that international pressure would then force Israel to accept Hamas’ harsh negotiating terms. In that view, civilians were not people to protect. They were leveraged.
Another feature presented as revealing Hamas’ nature is public execution. Even when forced into survival mode under Israeli attacks, Hamas, it says, never relented toward opponents. When it had the chance, it publicly executed dissenters.
On Oct. 13, 2025, the account continues, a U.S.-mediated ceasefire took effect only hours earlier when Hamas, already heavily damaged, moved quickly to reassert control over Gaza. Its militants beat and publicly executed people to suppress dissent. Videos of the executions circulated online.
In this telling, Hamas’ conduct in the Gaza War, from the alleged operational plan to the use of civilians as shields, from tunnel warfare to propaganda tactics, carried the shadow of “wolf warrior” methods. Beijing, it says, has maintained a diplomatic line that Hamas is not a terrorist organization.
The ‘Axis of Resistance’ and a party-state resemblance
The text argues that the political systems and party structures of “Axis of Resistance” members look strikingly similar to the CCP’s organization and political model.
It describes Hamas’ top leader as originally being the chairman of its Shura Council, later shifting to the chairman of its Political Bureau. Hamas’ Shura Council is described as having 60 members, most of them living in Gaza. The council selects 15 senior Political Bureau members from different branches, including Gaza, the West Bank, prisoners held in Israeli jails, and overseas offices.
It says that after July 31, 2024, two Hamas Political Bureau chiefs, Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, died in succession. Hamas then formed a leadership committee to manage transition affairs, following Sinwar’s prior recommendation. Members listed include Khaled Mashal, described as a former Political Bureau chief and the second to hold that post from 1996 to 2017; Khalil al-Hayya, described as current deputy Political Bureau chief and the Gaza Political Bureau chief; Zaher Jabarin, described as the West Bank Political Bureau chief; Muhammad Ismail Darwish, described as Shura Council chairman; and an unnamed Political Bureau secretary. The text says the first three, along with Mohammed Sinwar, described as one of the leaders of Hamas’ Qassam Brigades, are all possible candidates to become the next Political Bureau chief.
Hezbollah is described as a group listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Japan, Canada, Argentina, and other countries. Its top leader is its secretary-general. It once had a deputy secretary-general post, but after the third secretary-general, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, was killed in an airstrike and Naim Qasim succeeded him, the deputy position remained vacant.
The account describes Hezbollah as concentrating authority under a religious leader, rooted in the Shiite doctrine of Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. Decisions and will are carried out top-down. It describes Hezbollah’s highest decision-making bodies as the Majlis al-Shura and the Majlis al-Shura al-Karar. The former, it says, has 12 senior Islamic clerics and is responsible for tactical decisions and supervision of Hezbollah’s activities in Lebanon. Under it sit seven committees handling ideology, finance, military affairs, politics, justice, intelligence, and social affairs. The latter, it says, has 11 other clerics and handles strategic matters.
Iran, the text continues, presents itself as a multi-party Islamic republic with a president, a parliament, executive agencies, and elections. In practice, it argues, clerical rule overrides everything. The Supreme Leader, chosen by the Assembly of Experts, is the country’s highest leader and military commander and can appoint the president, the head of the Supreme Court, and the chief prosecutor.
It adds that the Assembly of Experts, the unelected Guardian Council, and the Expediency Discernment Council led and appointed by the Supreme Leader hold power higher than the president and government. Presidential candidates, election outcomes, and laws passed by parliament all require review and approval by the Guardian Council before taking effect. The structure is then compared to China’s system, where the CCP’s general secretary also serves as chairman of the Central Military Commission and state president, with the Politburo standing above the state government.
It further says similar parallels appear in Syria under Bashar al-Assad, who is described as having also served as secretary-general of Syria’s branch of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, and in Yemen’s Houthi movement. The Houthis’ “Supreme Political Council” is described as operating much like the CCP Politburo.
Israel breaks out of Beijing’s ‘political encirclement’
After the Oct. 7 attack, it says, Khaled Mashal called on Hezbollah and other countries and armed groups to join a “full-scale war” against Israel, aiming to trap Israel in two or more fronts.
It then surveys Israel’s surroundings. Hezbollah in Lebanon watches and waits in the north. In the northeast, Syria under Assad was described as a founding member of the “Axis of Resistance.” To the east, Jordan has diplomatic relations with Israel but supports Palestinian statehood, with shared security interests coexisting with major political differences. Egypt, the first Arab state to recognize Israel, maintains a strategic partnership despite historical grievances and the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia had pursued normalization with Israel before the Gaza War, but public Arab support for Palestinian statehood pushed relations back toward a standstill. The text adds that Iran remains a common enemy for both sides.
Farther away, the Houthis in Yemen repeatedly fired missiles at Israel and attacked international commercial shipping linked to Israel at Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The attacks created what it calls the “Red Sea crisis,” framed here as support for Hamas. Turkey, a major Mediterranean power, severed relations with Israel over the Gaza War, leaving ties at a historic low.
Because Israel is a longstanding U.S. ally, the text says, it was not surprising that Hamas publicly signaled goodwill toward Beijing, described here as being under CCP control. Hamas hoped Arab communities in Western countries would take part in pressuring Israel. It also looked to cooperation with China, Russia, and other superpowers. The account argues that the Gaza War forced Washington to split attention from the Russia–Ukraine war, giving Moscow breathing space, while Beijing could draw “inspiration” for a military move against Taiwan from the Oct. 7 attack. Hamas leaders are described as boasting that they were “giving the world a master class.”
As the war progressed, the account says, attention shifted. Focus moved from Hamas’ violence to humanitarian aid for Palestinians in Gaza. Criticism of Israel grew louder. Antisemitic demonstrations increased across Western countries. Even after reports emerged that some UNRWA staff were involved in the Oct. 7 attack, pressure on Israel did not diminish. In the end, it argues, antisemitism worldwide became the norm.
It cites tracking by the Combat Antisemitism Movement’s Antisemitism Research Center, saying that from 2023 through Aug. 28, 2025, about 13,339 antisemitic incidents were recorded worldwide, including violence, intimidation, and hate speech. It points to the 2025 Bondi Beach shooting in Sydney as a rare recent case, describing it as Australia’s first deadly attack targeting Jews and among the country’s deadliest terror attacks.
It argues that few actors can shape media narratives and public opinion on such a scale. If the CCP claimed second place, it says, no one would dare claim first.
Alleged attempts to encircle Israel
It then cites Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying that in September 2025 he directly accused Beijing and Qatar of launching an operation through Western media and social platforms aimed at “politically encircling” Israel, and that they supported forces aligned with Tehran. Iran, it says, previously attempted a “military encirclement” through proxies in the “Axis of Resistance,” but failed. Netanyahu is described as saying Israel would counter in its own way, and that Beijing and Qatar would not succeed because the United States stood with Israel and many other countries did as well. Israel, he said, would ultimately break this “political encirclement.”
The text then describes moves Israel made in response. In late December 2025, Israel signed a joint defense cooperation plan with Greece and Cyprus, including joint air and naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean in 2026. Earlier, leaders of the three countries signed an agreement in Jerusalem to strengthen maritime security cooperation and advance energy interconnection projects. It adds that Greece and Cyprus had already imported missiles worth billions of euros from Israel, and that Turkey watched these developments closely.
Then came what it calls an unexpected but logical move. On Dec. 26, the birthday of Mao Zedong, Israel became the first country to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of Somaliland, described as an entity in eastern Africa that lacks broad international recognition. Besides cooperation in agriculture, health, technology, and the economy, Somaliland is described as joining the Abraham Accords promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump. The text calls Israel’s move a skillful play.
Somaliland is described as the world’s largest de facto controlled territory that is not widely recognized. It is a strategic hub in the Horn of Africa, near the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. It can influence the Bab-el-Mandeb sea lane, described as a critical route linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. Establishing relations with Israel, the text argues, could bring benefits in agriculture, health, technology, and the economy, and also expose Somaliland to Israel’s military power and weaponry.
For Israel, cooperation with Somaliland would expand its footprint in the Horn of Africa, strike at the Houthis, constrain extremist Islamist forces in surrounding areas, and protect Israel’s freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
At the start of 2026, the text says, Israel and Somaliland began negotiations on establishing a military base in the Horn of Africa. If such an agreement is reached, it argues, Israel and the United States would gain leverage against China’s military base in Djibouti and would have found a way to break Beijing’s “political encirclement.”
The costs for Beijing, and Iran’s growing weakness
For Beijing, it argues, Israel’s move carried direct negative implications. Given China’s stance on the Gaza War and its alleged “political encirclement” efforts, Israel would likely deepen economic, agricultural, and military cooperation with Taiwan. The possibility of Taiwan gaining more international diplomatic recognition, the text suggests, could increase.
It adds that Taiwan’s existing relationship with Somaliland already threatened Beijing’s propaganda campaign for using force against Taiwan. Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system, it argues, would help Taiwan defend against attacks from the Chinese military.
It then describes what it calls an absurd diplomatic scene. Without canceling an African trip in 2026, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi abruptly canceled a planned visit to Somalia, citing “technical reasons.” China’s foreign ministry later issued a statement opposing Somaliland’s “collusion” with Taiwan to pursue independence. The point, it says, is obvious. Israel’s relationship with Somaliland hit Beijing hard.
At the same time, the text turns to Iran, described as the largest financial backer of the “Axis of Resistance.” Iran’s domestic situation deteriorated. A worsening economic crisis fueled public anger at surging inflation, rising food prices, and sharp currency depreciation. Protests erupted across the country, described here as the largest uprising since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
The government, it says, cut off internet and phone lines and opened fire to suppress the unrest, creating one of the most brutal massacres in modern Iranian history, with thousands killed.
When Tehran looked outward for help, the text says, it discovered that it was effectively isolated. After nearly four years of the Russia–Ukraine war, Moscow had little capacity for Middle East affairs and issued statements full of diplomatic phrasing. It adds that President Vladimir Putin was willing to donate $1 billion to a “Board of Peace” founded under U.S. President Donald Trump.
It then references what it calls the 2025 Israel–Iran “Twelve-Day War” and U.S. bombing that heavily damaged Iran’s nuclear facilities. After that, the text says, Beijing began assessing worst-case scenarios for Tehran, described as an energy partner that was not irreplaceable. Beijing also restarted the second phase of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline project with Russia.
China’s foreign ministry, it says, limited its support to diplomatic language and deliberately kept distance from Iran. The text argues that Beijing’s cold attitude toward a supposed “comprehensive strategic partnership” would be unforgettable for Tehran.
With Iran weakened, it asks, how long can Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iran-aligned militias in Iraq continue to leap about?