By Li Deyan
A sudden arrest, a shaken military
Information emerging from Beijing indicates that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli—two of the most senior figures in China’s military—have been secretly detained at highly guarded locations, amid growing signs that the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the armed forces is under severe strain.
According to multiple accounts, Zhang Youxia arrived at what was believed to be a routine meeting accompanied by only four bodyguards, only to be ambushed and arrested by more than one hundred security personnel. Other sources describe a military establishment spiraling into disorder: officers scrambling to resign or apply for demobilization, personnel departments overwhelmed, and commanders refusing to publicly align themselves with Xi Jinping despite direct pressure.
At the center of the crisis is Xi’s reported demand that group army commanders issue statements of loyalty following Zhang’s removal. Nearly all, according to insiders, have refused to speak.
Official charges and an unusually fast announcement
On Jan. 24, 2026, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC)—the Chinese Communist Party body that commands the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—and Liu Zhenli, chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, were under investigation for “serious violations of discipline and law.”
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Their removal leaves only one CMC member still in office besides Xi Jinping himself: Zhang Shengmin. Online commentators have noted, with biting irony, that Zhang Shengmin now bears “pressure never before seen.”
Rumors of Zhang Youxia’s downfall had circulated for days before the announcement. What distinguished this case, however, was speed. Zhang—unlike former CMC vice chairman He Weidong, whose fall was confirmed seven months after the fact—was publicly named within days. Zhang had served two full terms as vice chairman and was widely viewed as one of the most powerful men in the PLA.
The rapid disclosure is widely interpreted as a defensive move by Xi Jinping, aimed at stabilizing a volatile situation following a sudden internal strike. Delay, observers believe, would have risked further fragmentation inside the military.
Concerns intensified after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli both failed to appear at the opening of a high-level provincial- and ministerial-level leadership seminar on Jan. 20, as well as its closing session on Jan. 23. Their unexplained absence coincided precisely with the first reports that something had gone badly wrong.
Planned detention, not a spontaneous move
U.S.-based independent commentator Cai Shenkun reported on X that the operation against Zhang and Liu was meticulously planned rather than improvised. According to Cai, the Central Guard Bureau carried out the arrests at the Central Party School on Jan. 19, under the on-site supervision of Liu Jingguo, a deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the CCP’s top disciplinary authority.
That same evening, the news was communicated to officials at the vice–state level and above. By the following day, it had been transmitted to full ministerial-level cadres—an unusually rapid internal notification process.
Cai argued that the speed and severity of the official characterization reflected acute fear within the top leadership: fear of prolonged uncertainty, fear of backlash, and above all fear of instability within the PLA. The simultaneous release of authoritative editorials, he said, was intended as a blunt warning to party, government, and military elites not to act independently.
Conflicting accounts of the arrest
Alongside Cai’s account, other versions continue to circulate.
One claims that on Jan. 17, Xi Jinping deployed large numbers of armed police and military personnel to the Jingxi Hotel in western Beijing, where Zhang Youxia was seized after offering fierce resistance. Another asserts that Zhang was arrested on the evening of Jan. 19, one day before the leadership seminar began. In that version, Zhang arrived with only four bodyguards and was overwhelmed by more than one hundred operatives; members of his family were reportedly detained as well.
Sources in Beijing further allege that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli are now being held separately at a heavily fortified detention site in Changping District, Beijing, under conditions of total isolation.
A counterstrike that resembles a coup
China analyst Heng He told overseas Chinese-language media that Zhang Youxia’s removal should be understood as a full-scale counterstrike by Xi Jinping. Prior to this episode, Heng argued, Xi may have temporarily lost elements of real power in what amounted to a “quasi-coup.”
This time, however, Xi deployed the Central Guard Bureau and removed two senior CMC figures in a single stroke—an action that, in Heng’s assessment, “clearly qualifies as a coup in nature.”
Heng drew parallels to the Lin Biao Incident of the Cultural Revolution, when Mao Zedong’s designated successor was accused of plotting a coup and later died fleeing China. The difference, Heng emphasized, is structural. Lin Biao was Mao’s heir; Zhang Youxia represents entrenched blocs of power: the “princelings” descended from revolutionary elites, the Shaanxi faction, combat-experienced commanders within the PLA, and long-standing ties to senior party elders.
By moving against Zhang, Heng argued, Xi has simultaneously declared war on three forces: the military, the princeling elite, and the CCP’s old guard. Even if Xi has momentarily reasserted supreme authority, Heng warned, his rule now rests on dangerously unstable ground. He is increasingly isolated, surrounded by figures he cannot trust.
Officers exit, commanders refuse to speak
Many observers caution that Xi’s rapid takedown of Zhang Youxia offers no guarantee of long-term security. Zhang personally promoted thousands of generals whose influence permeates the PLA. Should Zhang’s loyalists mobilize, Xi himself could face serious consequences.
On Jan. 25, commentator Zhen Fei revealed on her program Zhen Perspectives that a retired officer from the PLA’s former 31st Group Army described the military as having descended into chaos. The 31st Group Army is associated with Miao Hua and He Weidong, and the source reportedly had extensive contact with both men prior to their transfers to Beijing.
According to the source, following Zhang’s fall, many officers at the regiment and division levels and above did not rush to demonstrate loyalty. Instead, they hurried to submit resignation or demobilization requests. Organizational departments, he said, were overwhelmed and forced to forward applications upward without processing them.
The method by which Zhang was removed sent shockwaves through the officer corps. “If someone with Zhang Youxia’s seniority and background can be taken away in minutes,” officers privately asked, “who will be next?” In that climate of fear, the safest option appeared to be escape.
The source described the PLA as entering a state of “passive resistance.” Senior officers seek to leave; group army commanders refuse to take public positions. Orders are passed down but met with superficial compliance—or ignored altogether. “No one is really working anymore,” he said. Questions of authority, responsibility, and basic operational direction have become unresolved.
Xi’s authority questioned inside the PLA
Xi Jinping, having removed Zhang Youxia, is acutely concerned about the military’s reaction. According to the source, Xi has demanded public declarations of support from group army commanders. Almost none have responded.
The reason, the source explained, lies in the PLA’s culture of seniority and loyalty. Zhang Youxia commanded immense respect, and no officer wants to be the first to publicly abandon him.
More strikingly, the source claimed that Xi has far less moral authority within the PLA than he appears to believe. Many officers, he said, view Xi as “deeply unscrupulous” and regard him as possessing “no real prestige” within the military.
Xi may attempt to promote a new generation of loyalists—“new He Weidongs” or “new Miao Huas.” But whether such figures would obey him, or dare to act decisively, remains an open question. Xi’s habitual pattern, the source noted, is to use allies and then discard them: relying on Wang Qishan to carry out purges before sidelining him; using Zhang Youxia to eliminate Zhou Yongkang and Xu Caihou, only to turn on Zhang himself.
This cycle of “use and discard” has, in the source’s words, destroyed any sense of security within the military system.