Greenland, geography, and the shortest path to the United States
When U.S. President Donald Trump floated the idea of purchasing Greenland, many dismissed it as political fantasy. Yet in a Jan. 19 op-ed published in The Washington Times, Yu Maochun contends that the proposal points to a far graver strategic reality: the Chinese Communist Party is executing a carefully designed, long-term Arctic strategy whose ultimate objective is to establish a strategic foothold on the periphery of the United States.
Yu begins with a startling but consequential geographic fact: Greenland is closer to New York than it is to Copenhagen. This is not merely a cartographic curiosity. In the age of ballistic missiles, the shortest distance between any two points on the globe is the great-circle route—and the optimal flight path for intercontinental ballistic missiles traveling from Eurasia to North America passes directly over the Arctic and Greenland.
From this perspective, Greenland is effectively America’s “northern high ground,” not Denmark’s distant backyard.
The United States already recognizes this reality. It maintains the Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) in northwestern Greenland—the U.S. military’s northernmost installation. The base hosts advanced ballistic missile early-warning radars and space surveillance systems and constitutes a critical node in the defense of the U.S. homeland.
Should the CCP succeed in establishing monitoring, communications, or dual-use infrastructure anywhere in the Arctic—especially if coordinated with Russia’s military presence—the warning time for detecting an attack on the United States would shrink dramatically. America’s missile defense system would face challenges without precedent.
China’s claim to be a ‘near-Arctic state’
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China lies more than 1,000 kilometers south of the Arctic Circle. Yet in 2018, Beijing released its first Arctic Policy white paper, redefining itself as a “near-Arctic state.” Yu argues that this designation is a political assertion rather than a geographic reality—one intended to manufacture legitimacy for CCP expansion in the Arctic and to advance its stated goal of becoming a polar power by 2030.
Beijing’s Arctic activities are broad and steadily expanding. They include the construction of an icebreaker fleet, the establishment of research stations, and repeated attempts to acquire land and infrastructure in strategically sensitive locations. Each initiative is presented under the banners of scientific research or commercial development, yet their military and strategic implications are unmistakable.
Where Russia relies primarily on overt military deterrence in the Arctic, China plays a longer and more sophisticated game. With an economy roughly ten times the size of Russia’s, the CCP deploys capital, technology, and diplomacy to embed itself gradually across the region.
According to Yu, this is not a collection of isolated projects but a coordinated campaign spanning economics, science, and foreign policy, designed to accumulate long-term leverage.
Dual-use infrastructure and the logic of penetration
Beijing’s method is to finance infrastructure, dominate supply chains, and secure positions in critical sectors such as telecommunications, satellites, ports, and mineral extraction. The danger of this “dual-use” strategy lies precisely in its legality and concealment.
A port, a mine, or a subsea fiber-optic cable may appear entirely commercial in peacetime. In a crisis, each can be converted into a strategic asset. The concern is magnified by Chinese law, which obliges all Chinese companies and citizens to cooperate with state intelligence work upon request.
In 2011, Chinese tycoon Huang Nubo attempted to purchase roughly 300 square kilometers of land in northern Iceland, ostensibly to build a tourism resort. The land lay near critical Arctic shipping routes. Although the deal was ultimately blocked, the CCP did not abandon its ambitions, instead turning to subtler methods such as scientific cooperation and local investment to preserve influence.
Territorial transactions are not unthinkable
Trump’s Greenland proposal may have shocked public opinion, but Yu stresses that it is not without historical precedent. Denmark has repeatedly sold overseas territories when strategic conditions changed or costs outweighed benefits.
In 1845, it sold its Indian possessions; in 1850, the Gold Coast (modern-day Ghana); and in 1868, the Nicobar Islands. Most notably, in 1917 Denmark sold the Danish West Indies to the United States for $25 million in gold, creating what are now the U.S. Virgin Islands.
These cases demonstrate that Danish sovereignty over distant territories has never been immutable. Today, Greenland requires roughly $600 million in annual subsidies from Denmark, a significant burden for a small state.
China and Russia: different threats, one strategic convergence
Yu emphasizes that China and Russia pose different but complementary threats in the Arctic. Russia favors direct military pressure; China specializes in long-term infiltration through ostensibly civilian means.
Together, they create a compound challenge. Russia provides military depth and geographic advantage, while China supplies capital, technology, and logistical support. A tighter Sino-Russian alignment in the Arctic would place unprecedented strain on NATO’s northern flank.
Western states face a structural dilemma: the CCP continues to exploit open markets while converting economic access into strategic power. Under China’s military–civil fusion doctrine, even legitimate commercial projects may carry latent military value.
Denial as the strategic core
For Yu, the decisive issue is not whether China becomes an Arctic power, but whether the United States and its allies can prevent Beijing from establishing covert, dual-use footholds.
The strategic answer is denial—ensuring that the northern high ground is not quietly occupied by the CCP as Arctic ice recedes. Greenland lies at the center of this effort, anchoring U.S. missile early-warning systems and commanding access to emerging Arctic routes.
NATO’s northern flank under pressure
China’s Arctic advance also threatens NATO’s collective defense. The Arctic connects North America and Europe, and any U.S. reinforcement of Europe would pass through its northern approaches.
Chinese surveillance or anti-ship capabilities in the region could track or disrupt NATO movements, undermining the credibility of the alliance’s security guarantees.
Greenland and the future of Arctic power politics
The Greenland debate crystallizes twenty-first-century great-power competition in the Arctic. Through the rhetoric of a “near-Arctic state” and the practice of military–civil fusion, the CCP is embedding itself in a region once considered remote.
For the United States, the Arctic is no longer peripheral. It is a frontline of homeland defense.
Trump’s proposal, regardless of feasibility, forced a reassessment of that reality. As China expands its global reach, the United States and its allies must ensure the Arctic does not become a new platform for threatening Western security.